Article 136 | Motion to suppress NCDRC’s order pending in Exercise of Appellate/Revisional Jurisdiction refuted: Supreme Court
Case Title: M/S Universal Sompo General Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Suresh Chand Jain, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5263 Of 2023
Summary
The Supreme Court has granted special leave to appeal to an order issued by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) in accordance with Article 136 of the Constitution. The order is only applicable in extraordinary circumstances, such as a decision that deeply concerns the court or involves a matter of public concern or law. The Supreme Court’s authority to grant special leave to appeal is limited to orders issued by the NCDRC in its appellate or revisional jurisdiction, or as the court of first instance (original orders).
In a case involving an insurance policy dispute, the Supreme Court ruled that the aggrieved party could contest the NCDRC’s order by petitioning the appropriate High Court with jurisdiction. The court drew its precedent from the recent ruling in Faizan v. Omaxe Buildhome Private Limited, which established that an appeal to the relevant High Court with jurisdiction under Article 227 would be the only recourse for the aggrieved party against the order issued by the NCDRC.
The petitioner was allowed to contest the NCDRC’s order by petitioning the appropriate High Court with jurisdiction, either by filing a writ application in accordance with Article 226 of the Constitution or by invoking the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Both parties retain the prerogative to petition the Supreme Court for permission to appeal in accordance with Article 136 of the Constitution via plea of special leave.
About the case
An order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) that was issued by the Commission in its original jurisdiction is the only one for which an aggrieved party may petition the Supreme Court on Wednesday, in accordance with Article 136 of the Constitution, to be granted special leave to appeal. The orders rendered by the NCDRC in the exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction will not be subject to any further appeal, the Apex Court clarified. In the aforementioned case, a division bench consisting of Justices Manoj Misra and J. B. Pardiwala examined the scope of Article 136 of the Constitution by referencing a series of decisions from the apex court.
The bench concluded that the provision could only be invoked in the event that the court was moved to intervene in a public interest legal matter or in opposition to a decision that deeply troubled the court’s conscience. “…the Supreme Court’s authority to grant special leave to appeal may be invoked only in the most extraordinary of circumstances.” Special leave is typically granted in response to a decision that deeply concerns the Court or involves a matter of public concern or law. These are examples of circumstances that warrant special leave. Without limitation, the provisions of Article 136 of the Constitution are unrestricted. Then again, in situations where the aggrieved party has the option to petition the High Court for special leave under its supervisory jurisdiction or writ jurisdiction, this Court should not grant the petition, thus bypassing the prescribed legal procedure.
Regardless of the constraints, they are intrinsic to the very essence and character of the power. As an extraordinary and supreme force, it is only prudent to employ it judiciously, with restraint, and in extremely rare circumstances. Preceding the exercise of superseding constitutional powers, the power in question shall be applied exclusively to further the cause of justice and shall be regulated by established principles. While the Court deliberated on an SLP filed by the NCDRC in opposition to a dismissal order, the SLP challenged the appeal of an order issued by the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (SCDRC). In exercising its appellate jurisdiction, the Court deliberated on whether an SLP should be accepted directly against an order issued by the NCDRC when the aggrieved party may petition the appropriate High Court pursuant to Article 226 or Article 277. After careful examination of the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (which are relevant to the Consumer Protection Act, 2019), the Apex Court determined that the appeal to the Apex Court is limited to orders issued by the NCDRC in accordance with the authority granted by Section 21(a)(i) of the Act 1986 and 58(1)(a)(i) or 58(1)(a)(ii) of the Act 2019. “…both Acts establish the right to appeal to this Court solely regarding orders issued by the NCDRC in its appellate or revisional jurisdiction, or as the court of first instance (original orders); no additional appeals are permitted against orders issued by the NCDRC in the course of exercising its appellate or revisional jurisdiction.” As observed by the Apex Court.
The Respondent had obtained insurance policies from Allahabad Bank and Universal Sompo General Insurance, the Petitioner in the case before the Apex Court, covering a maximum of Rs. 50 lakh against the risks of fire and larceny. This information is part of the factual matrix of the case. The Respondent filed a claim for Rs. 49 lakh subsequent to experiencing larceny and a fire outbreak at his property. The Respondent filed a complaint with the SCDRC in opposition to the Petitioner’s denial of the claim. The complaint was partially upheld by the SCDRC.
The insurance provider and the transferee of the offending vehicle have no contractual or other relationship :Delhi High Court
Case Title: Indiwar Parijat V. National Insurance Company Ltd & Ors and other connected matter
Summary
The Delhi High Court ruled that an insurance company has no contractual relationship with the transferee of a negligent vehicle in a road disaster. The court stated that the registered owner cannot absolve themselves of liability by asserting that they transferred the vehicle prior to the accident date. The insurance company’s role is to indemnify losses incurred by victims, who are the primary individual liable. The court also stated that if the registered proprietor attempts to benefit from the contract by indemnifying themselves against liability, they are also responsible for repaying any compensation the insurance company may pay to the victims. The court dismissed the appeal lodged by the motorcycle’s registered proprietor, allowing the insurance company to pursue reimbursement of the minor boy for the claim amount.
About the case
According to the Delhi High Court, in the event of a road disaster, an insurance company has no contractual or other relationship with the transferee of the negligent vehicle. Justice Navin Chawla stated, “The registered owner cannot absolve himself of liability by asserting that he transferred the vehicle in question to a third party prior to the date of the accident.”
The court noted that the role of the insurance company is to indemnify the losses incurred by the victims of the road accident, which are the responsibility of the registered owner of the offending vehicle as the primary individual liable. “Such persons whom the registered owner claims to have transferred the offending vehicle cannot be pursued by the victims of the road accident or the insurance company, and they cannot be required to follow a trail of successive transfers that are not registered with the Registering Authority,” the court ruled. It further stated: “Should the registered proprietor of the negligent vehicle attempt to benefit from the contract by indemnifying themselves against liability, they are also responsible for repaying any compensation the insurance company may pay to the victims of the road accident, provided the insurance company is otherwise entitled to the same.”” In the midst of addressing two appeals filed by the registered owner of a motorbike and a youth operating it that collided with a woman who subsequently died of her injuries, the court rendered these remarks.
They appealed a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal order that awarded the claimants compensation in the amount of Rs. 15,49,324 and ordered the insurance company, National Insurance Company Limited, to pay the amount in the initial instance. Additionally, the tribunal granted the insurance company the right to pursue reimbursement of the compensation amount from the registered owner of the motorbike in which the child was operating at the moment of the collision.
When Justice Chawla observed that a minor was operating the motorbike at the time of the collision, he stated that the registered owner of the vehicle cannot absolve himself of responsibility by claiming to have sold the motorbike prior to the accident date, provided he did not take any additional steps to notify the Registration Authority or the Insurance Company of the sale. “He retains liability for the actions of any third party allowed to use the vehicle by the registered owner, who may be in breach of a sales contract.” “Viciously, the registered owner is liable for the conduct of the third party if that third party again permits a minor or an individual lacking a valid driver’s license to operate the vehicle,” the court stated. As a consequence, the appeal lodged by the motorcycle’s registered proprietor was dismissed by the court. The court vacated the contested award, permitting the insurance company to pursue the minor boy for reimbursement of the claim amount. The court ordered that “the statutory amount deposited by the appellant, Sh.Rohit Rana, plus interest accrued thereon, be released in the appellant’s favor.”
