Case Title – Sub-Area Manager, Western CoalFields Ltd., Padmapur, Chandrapur. v. Anjutai Wd/o Rajkumar Tiple
Summary
The Bombay High Court has upheld a compensation judgment for a Western Coalfields Ltd. (WCL) employee who died after colliding with a crane operated by another employee. The court determined that a crane used within coal mine premises is a “motor vehicle” as defined by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MVA). The appellant’s argument that the crane is not a motor vehicle because it is used on the private premises of WCL was not acceptable. The court upheld the decision, stating that the crane is protected by the Motor Vehicles Act and there is no pleading regarding contributory negligence or the fact that the accident took place on WCL’s private premises. The court applied the same reasoning to the crane in the present case, stating that it is not excluded from the definition of a motor vehicle solely because it was used within WCL’s premises. The court stated that compensation must be assessed on the basis of equity, reasonableness, and equitability, as it is impossible to achieve perfection.
About the case
The Bombay High Court recently determined that a crane utilized within coal mine premises is a “motor vehicle” as defined by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MVA).
A compensation judgment for the family of a Western Coalfields Ltd. (WCL) employee who died after colliding with a crane operated by another employee was upheld by Justice Urmila Joshi Phalke of the Nagpur bench.
“…the appellant’s argument is that the Crane is not a motor vehicle because it is used on the private premises of the W.C.L. This is not acceptable.” The court determined that it is a motor vehicle in accordance with the definition outlined in Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
Rajkumar Tiple, who passed away in 2013, was traveling toward Padmapur Colliery in Chandrapur while operating a scooter. The crane collided with his vehicle, resulting in his immediate death.
The family of the deceased was awarded compensation of Rs. 62,26,400/- by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal. The compensation will be paid jointly and severally by WCL and the crane driver.
Consequently, WCL initiated the current appeal under section 173 of the MVA to contest the compensation order.
The appellant’s advocate, Shriram Chopra, contended that the crane is not included in the MVA’s definition of a “motor vehicle” because it is operated within the private premises of WCL rather than on a public road.
He also argued that the deceased perpetrated contributory negligence and that the alleged accident took place on the private premises of WCL. He also argued that the compensation is exorbitant.
The claimants’ advocate, PR Agrawal, argued that the crane is protected by the Motor Vehicles Act. Additionally, he contended that there is no pleading regarding contributory negligence or the fact that the accident took place on the private premises of WCL.
The deceased, along with one pillion rider, was traveling to the colony on his scooter when he was knocked from behind the crane, according to both the claimant’s and WCL’s witnesses.
Therefore, the court determined that this is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the crane driver was operating it in a reckless and negligent manner, which resulted in the accident. The claimants’ case will not be harmed by their failure to examine the pillion rider, the court determined.
As there was no pleading regarding contributory negligence in WCL’s written statement, the court rejected its contention. The court also rejected the argument that the accident occurred on private WCL premises for the same reason.
The term “Motor Vehicle” or “vehicle” is defined in Section 2(28) of the Motor Vehicle Act as any mechanically propelled vehicle that is designed for use on roads, with the exception of vehicles that are designed for use exclusively in a factory or enclosed premises or those that are designed to travel on fixed rails.
The court cited Bose Abraham v. State of Kerala, which established that excavators are not excluded from the definition of “motor vehicle” solely because they are utilized in an enclosed area; they are still permissible for use on public highways.
The court applied the same reasoning to the crane in the present case, stating that it is not excluded from the definition of a motor vehicle solely because it was used within the premises of WCL.
The court stated that compensation must be assessed on the basis of equity, reasonableness, and equitability, as it is impossible to achieve perfection. The court further added that compensation cannot be a mere pittance.
The concept of “just compensation” must be approached from the perspective of fairness, reasonableness, and the non violation of the principle of equitability. The legal heirs of the claimants are not entitled to a windfall in the event of their demise. Concurrently, compensation cannot serve as an apology for compensation. “The court’s opinion is that it cannot be a pittance.”
Under the “future prospects” component of the compensation, the trial court had awarded 30% of the deceased’s salary. WCL contended that the percentage should have been 25 percent.
The High Court observed that the deceased was a permanent employee of WCL and was between the ages of 40 and 50. The trial court correctly applied the guidelines for calculating future prospects provided by the Apex Court, as the court held.
Consequently, the court maintained the compensation amount that the trial court had awarded.
